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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
v. 
RANDALL LAW, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Appellate Case No. 20020578-CA 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appellant relies on his opening brief and replies to the State's brief as follows. 
Arguments not addressed in reply were either adequately covered in the opening brief or do 
not require response. 
ARGUMENT 
Point 1. This Case is a Case of First Impression. It Constitutes an Extraordinary 
Circumstance that Falls Outside the General Meaning and Purpose of Rule 11 of 
the UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE. 
The State claims that Appellant's argument fails for lack of record support. The State 
cites to case law that limits an appellate court's review to 'the evidence contained in the 
record on appeal," and that "an appellant's addendum may not consist of evidence that is 
outside the record on appeal. State v. Pliego, 974 P.2d 279, 280-281 (Utah 1999). While these 
are well-established interpretations of Rule 11 of the UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE/ 
the extraordinary circumstances of this case fall outside the purpose and affect of Rule 11. 
"The role of the appellate court is to sift through the parties9 arguments in the light of 
the facts found by the trial court and square them with the law." Olson v. Part-Craig-Olson, 
Inc., 815 P.2d 1356, 1359 (Utah Ct App, 1991) (citation ommitted). The appellate court may 
"only weigh those facts and legal arguments preserved for [it] in the trial record." Id. 
Therefore, the ban on allowing evidence not found in the trial record is meant to stop the 
appellate court from reviewing a decision based on new evidence that is pertinent to the 
decision itself. 
Rule 11 of the UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE provides the procedure with 
which to supplement the trial record. According to Rule 11(h), "[i]f anything material to 
either party is omitted from the record by error or accident or is misstated, the parties by 
stipulation, the trial court, or the appellate court... may direct that the omission or 
misstatement be corrected and if necessary that a supplemental record be certified and 
transmitted." This Court has held that a motion under Rule 11(h) "is appropriate only when 
the record must be augmented because of an omission or exclusion, or a dispute as to the 
accuracy of reporting, and not to introduce new material into the record." Olsen, 815 P.2d at 
1359. 
Rule 11 has been interpreted to mean a complete ban on any and all evidence pertinent 
to appeal that is not contained in the record of the trial court. But the rule deals solely with 
1
 Utah R. of App. P. 11 governs the record on appeal. 
2 
evidence upon which the decision was based. While that may apply to most cases that have 
been heard by the appellate courts, this case presents a unique situation. 
This is a case of first impression. The circumstances in this case are highly 
extraordinary. The appeal stems from a judge who abused his discretion at sentencing due to 
his regular use of drugs and the physical and mental consequences of such drug abuse. Now 
this same judge has been convicted of charges stemming from his drug abuse. Appellant is not 
asking this Court to review the sentence based upon the judge's factual findings nor on any 
facts presented to the judge. Appellant is seeking review based on the extrinsic factors which 
influenced the judge, namely the judge's drug abuse. This is a new classification of evidence 
which Rule 11 and the subsequent case law does not address, and which this Court must now 
address. The appellate court cannot be blindly bound to the record in this instance. 
As such, the supplemental procedures outlined in Rule 11(h) do not automatically apply 
in this situation. As this court has held, a motion to supplement the record is available only 
when there is an omission or exclusion of evidence that had appeared below, or a dispute as to 
the accuracy of reporting, giving rise to the need to augment the record. See Olson, 815 P.2d 
at 1359. That is not the case here, as the evidence in question is pertinent extrinsic evidence 
as to the state of mind of the judge during sentencing. The fact that such evidence could not 
exist in the trial record cannot impede this Court's ability to review the decision in the lower 
court. Such a consequence would result in a great inequity for any person seeking appeal 
under a related circumstance. It would result in a defendant being subject to the whims of a 
trial judge who, under some harmful external influence, abused his discretion, without any 
ability to have an appellate court review and correct the injustice. 
3 
The State relies on State v. Pliego, 974 P.2d 279 (Utah 1999), which provides an all-
encompassing ban on any and all evidence outside the record. Br. Aplee at 6. As detailed 
above, this is the precise interpretation that could result in the inability of an appellate court to 
review abuses of discretion by the trial court below. This Court should, therefore, specify an 
exception, taken on a case by case basis, for review of such pertinent extrinsic evidence as is 
necessary to prevent injustice. 
Since the strict procedure set forth in Rule 11(h) for supplementing the record does not 
apply in this instance, as shown above, the factors with which the court should evaluate the 
need for supplemental material are not automatically required. These factors "include the 
necessity of the supplemental material, prior opportunity to introduce the supplemental 
material and length of the resulting delay/9 Jeschke v. Willis, 793 P.2d 428 (Utah Ct. App. 
1990). These factors, however, are relevant to the situation presented here. The necessity of 
the extrinsic material is clear; Judge Harding, Jr., has been convicted of drug possession and 
use during the period of time that he determined Appellant's sentence.2 This evidence is 
necessary in the determination of the soundness of Appellant's sentence. There was no prior 
opportunity to introduce the evidence, as Judge Harding, Jr., failed to disclose any drug abuse, 
and this abuse did not come to light until his arrest a short time after the final sentencing 
hearing. There is no delay that will affect this appeal due to the allowance of this evidence. 
Therefore, even considering the factors for allowing supplemental evidence, this evidence 
should be allowed. 
2
 The further evidence of the inequity of Appellant's sentence is fully discussed in Appellant's 
opening brief. 
4 
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CONCLUSION 
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Chief Deputy Civil 
KIRK TORGENSEN 
Chief Deputy Criminal 
13 March 2002 
Ms. Paulette Stagg 
Clerk of the Court 
Utah Court of Appeals 
450 South State, 5th Floor 
P.O. Box 140230 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0230 
Re: Jones v. State, No. 20010375-CA 
Dear Ms. Stagg: 
This letter is offered pursuant to rule 24(i), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
Shortly before the State filed its brief on 23 January 2002, the Utah Supreme Court issued 
State v. Jones, 2002 UT 01, Utah Adv. Rep. , which is relevant to whether 
defendant can challenge the evidence supporting his conviction after entering a guilty and 
mentally ill plea. See Aplt. Br. at 6-7; Aple. Br. at 10-12. A copy of Jones, as it was 
reissued in early March, is attached for your convenience. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Karen A. Klucznik ' 
Assistant Attorney General 
cc: David Thayne Jones, Petitioner, pro se (with enclosures) 
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This opinion is subject to revision before final 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
00O00 
State of Utah, No. 20000238 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Jeffrey Lynn Jones, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
The Honorable Stanton M. Taylor 
Second District Court, Weber County 
Attorneys: Mark L. Shurtleff, Att'y Gen., Christopher D. 
Ballard, Asst. Att'y Gen., Salt Lake City, 
Sandra L. Corp, Ogden, for plaintiff 
Maurice Richards, Jerald N. Engstrom, Ogden, 
for defendant 
HOWE, Chief Justice: 
INTRODUCTION 
$1 Defendant Jeffrey Lynn Jones appeals his convictions 
which were based on his conditional plea of guilty and mentally 
ill to two counts of attempted aggravated murder, both first 
degree felonies, in violation of section 76-5-202 (1) (b) & (c) of 
the Utah Code (1999). Defendant's plea reserved the right to 
appeal the denial of his motion to quash the bindover. 
BACKGROUND 
12 After consuming beer and whiskey at his father's home, 
defendant entered a convenience store in Ogden, Utah, carrying a 
loaded shotgun. He immediately shot and wounded a customer, Dan 
Nebeker, and then leaned over the counter and shot Karan Rice, 
the store's clerk. Next, defendant turned around and shot 
Nebeker a second time. He then took additional shells from his 
pocket, reloaded the shotgun, and fired two more times at Rice. 
Finally, defendant laid the shotgun on the store counter, called 
F I L E D 
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911, and reported that he had killed two individuals. He stayed 
on the telephone until the police arrived and arrested him. Both 
victims survived the incident. 
13 Defendant was charged with two counts of attempted 
aggravated murder, both first degree felonies, in violation of 
section 76-5-202 (1)(b) & (c). After a preliminary hearing, the 
court bound over defendant for trial on both counts. 
Subsequently, he moved to quash the bindover, arguing that the 
State could not properly charge him with attempted aggravated 
murder because that crime does not exist in Utah. The district 
court denied the motion to quash the bindover, and defendant 
petitioned this court to review the interlocutory order. We 
denied that petition. 
14 Defendant then entered a conditional plea of guilty and 
mentally ill, reserving his right to appeal the denial of his 
motion to quash the bindover. Following a hearing to determine 
defendant's mental status, the district court found that he 
suffered from depression and anxiety, but, "in spite of these 
problems . . . the real motivation involved in the commission of 
this [crime] didn't relate to those things." Instead, the court 
attributed the crime to "excessive amounts of alcohol and the 
defendant's character." The court concluded that he was not 
mentally ill as defined by section 76-2-305 of the Utah Code and 
sentenced him to serve two concurrent terms of five years to 
life. Defendant now appeals his convictions. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
i5 Whether the crime of attempted aggravated murder exists 
in Utah is a question of law, reviewed for correctness, giving no 
deference to the trial court's conclusion. Stephens v. 
Bonneville Travel, Inc., 935 P.2d 519, 519 (Utah 1997). The 
trial court's finding that defendant was not mentally ill is a 
factual determination reviewed for clear error, giving deference 
to the trial court's findings. State v. DePlonty, 749 P.2d 621, 
627 (Utah 1987) . 
ANALYSIS 
16 Defendant raises two arguments: (1) the trial court 
erred when it refused to quash the bindover on two counts of 
attempted aggravated murder because that crime does not exist, 
and (2) the trial court erred when it failed to find him mentally 
ill at the time of sentencing. We address each issue in turn. 
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I. ATTEMPTED AGGRAVATED MURDER 
17 Defendant contends he was improperly charged with 
attempted aggravated murder because that crime does not exist in 
Utah. He was charged under section 76-5-202 (1) (b) and (c) of the 
Utah Code, which provides: 
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes aggravated 
murder if the actor intentionally or knowingly 
causes the death of another under any of the 
following circumstances: 
(b) the homicide was committed 
incident to one act, scheme, course 
of conduct, or criminal episode 
during which two or more persons 
were killed, or during which the 
actor attempted to kill one 
or more persons in addition to the 
victim who was killed; 
(c) the actor knowingly created a 
great risk of death to a person 
other than the victim and the 
actor[.] 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202 (1999). The purpose behind the 
aggravating circumstances requirement is "to distinguish between 
those types of murders which the legislature feels should be 
punished more severely than other murders." State v. James, 819 
P.2d 781, 796 (Utah 1991). There is no requirement that a 
defendant 
kill the "two or more" persons referred to in 
subsection (1)(b) or that a defendant kill 
one person and be a party to the murder of 
the others. The killings must occur during 
one act, scheme, course of conduct, or 
criminal episode, but the defendant need only 
be responsible for one of them. 
State v. Alvarez, 872 P.2d 450, 459 (Utah 1994). In the case 
before us, defendant asserts that because the incident resulted 
in the wounding of two victims, but not in the death of either of 
them, the aggravating circumstances listed in section 
76-5-202(1) (b) and (c) are not applicable to his case. 
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18 Because both victims survived, the State charged 
defendant with attempted aggravated murder. In support of his 
contention that the charged crime does not exist, defendant 
relies upon State v. Bell, where we held that "the felony murder 
rule cannot be applied unless the death of another occurred. 
Thus, the crime of attempted felony murder does not exist as a 
crime in Utah." 785 P.2d 390 (Utah 1989). Defendant's argument, 
however, confuses felony murder with attempted murder. Under the 
felony murder doctrine, any death resulting from the commission 
or attempted commission of an enumerated felony is enhanced to 
murder, regardless of the intent of the actor. See Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-5-202 (1) (d) (1999). Because the felony murder doctrine 
does not demand proof of intent, the statute requires death of a 
victim in order to constitute that crime. See Bell, 785 P.2d at 
390. 
19 In contrast, an attempted murder is "an act done with 
the intent to commit that crime . . . but falls short of its 
actual commission." State v. Norman, 580 P.2d 237, 239 (Utah 
1978), overruled on other grounds by State v. Standiford, 769 
P.2d 254, 259 (Utah 1988). Sectaon 76-4-101 of the Utah Code 
provides: 
(1) For purposes of this part a person is 
guilty of an attempt to commit a crime if, 
acting with the kind of culpability otherwise 
required for the commission of the offense, 
he engages in conduct constituting a 
substantial step toward commission of 
the offense. 
(2) For purposes of this part, conduct does 
not constitute a substantial step unless it 
is strongly corroborative of the actor's 
intent to commit the offense. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-101 (1999). Thus, the offense of attempt 
requires an intent tQ commit a specific offense. See Bell, 785 
P.2d at 390. "In establishing the nexus between intent and act 
it must be borne in mind that an attempt transcends intent, yet 
fails to culminate in its planned accomplishment." State v. 
Castonquav, 663 P.2d 1323, 1326 (Utah 1983). The intent required 
to commit attempted aggravated murder is "the same intent as that 
required to commit the murder itself and may be inferred from 
defendant's conduct and the surrounding circumstances." State v. 
Collier, 736 P.2d 231, 234 (Utah 1987); see also State v. Howard, 
405 A.2d 206, 212 (Me. 1979) (stating the "person is guilty of 
criminal attempt if he acts with the intent to complete the 
commission of target offense"). 
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^10 In Bell, the defendant shot his victim during the 
commission of a robbery. Because the victim survived, this court 
held that the defendant was improperly charged with attempted 
felony murder. 785 P.2d at 394. However, the facts in the 
instant case differ significantly from those in Bell. Here, 
defendant was not committing an underlying felony when the act of 
shooting his victims occurred. Instead, acting with the kind of 
culpability required to commit aggravated murder, he 
intentionally and knowingly walked into the convenience store, 
with no apparent purpose other than to shoot someone. He did 
everything he could to facilitate the offense short of inflicting 
actual death. Defendant conducted himself in such an unambiguous 
way as to not reasonably allow for any other mens rea. See 
Jeffrey F. Ghent, Annotation, What Constitutes Attempted Murder, 
54 A.L.R.3d 612 (1973). The facts, and the absence of any 
innocent explanation for his conduct, are strongly corroborative 
of his intent to commit aggravated murder. Thus, Bell is not 
supportive of his position. 
Sill Defendant contends that the State did not prove his 
intent to kill anyone in the shootings, and that "absent the 
physical facts" surrounding the incident, there was no evidence 
of whether he merely intended to injure rather than kill his 
victims. His contention lacks merit. Normally, "where it takes 
a particular intent to constitute a crime that particular intent 
must be proved either by direct or circumstantial evidence, which 
would warrant the inference of the intent with which the act was 
done." Castonquay, 663 P.2d at 1326 (quoting Thacker v. 
Commonwealth, 114 S.E. 504, 505 (1922)). However, in this case, 
defendant waived the right to raise this argument. The 
obligation of the State was relieved when defendant admitted his 
intent by pleading guilty and mentally ill to the charges against 
him. Bruner v. Carver, 920 P.2d 1153, 1156 (Utah 1996) (holding 
that when an accused pleads guilty, he gives up the presumption 
of innocence). Thus, the State's burden of proof was eliminated 
when defendant formally admitted his intent by pleading guilty 
and mentally ill as charged. 
II. MENTAL ILLNESS 
112 Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it 
failed to find him mentally ill at the time of sentencing. 
Section 76-2-305 of the Utah Code defines mental illness as 
(4)(a) . . . a mental disease or defect that 
substantially impairs a person's mental, 
emotional, or behavioral functioning. A 
mental defect may be a congenital condition, 
the result of injury, or a residual effect of 
5 No. 20000238 
a physical or mental disease and includes, 
but is not limited to mental retardation. 
(b) "Mental illness" does not mean: 
(i) a personality or character 
disorder; or 
(ii) an abnormality manifested primarily 
by repeated criminal conduct. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-305 (1999). 
1113 In this case, the State's expert testified that in her 
opinion defendant was not mentally ill within the definition 
provided by section 76-2-305. In contrast, defendant's expert 
witness testified that alcoholism was a mental illness. 
Defendant complains that the trial court disregarded the 
testimony of his expert witness. However, "the fact finder was 
not obliged to accept his disclaimers, but could draw his own 
conclusion from the evidence." State v. Hansen, 732 P.2d 127, 
131 (Utah 1987) (citing State v. Carlson, 635 P.2d 72, 74-75 
(Utah 1981)). The fact that there is a diagnosis does not result 
in the court being required to find defendant mentally ill; the 
question is whether the diagnosis is a mental illness under the 
statute. Thus, it was not clear error for the trial court to 
refuse to find him mentally ill. 
K14 Lastly, defendant contends that the trial court should 
have applied section 76-5-205.5 to reduce his conviction to 
attempted murder. However, "we do not consider this argument as 
it is presented for the first time on appeal, and there is no 
record before this court to substantiate [defendant's] claim." 
Hansen, 732 P.2d at 131. Even if this court were to address the 
claim, subsection (3) of the statute provides: 
(3) A defendant who was under the influence 
of voluntarily consumed, injected, or 
ingested alcohol, controlled substance, or 
volatile substances at the time of the 
alleged offense may not claim mitigation of 
the offense under this section on the basis 
of mental illness if the alcohol or substance 
caused, triggered, or substantially 
contributed to the mental illness, 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-205.5(3) (1999). Here, the trial court 
found that "excessive amounts of alcohol which [defendant] was 
consuming at the time" motivated him to shoot his victims. Thus, 
No. 2000238 6 
defendant is precluded from mitigation of his offense under this 
section. 
CONCLUSION 
115 We hold that attempted aggravated murder does exist as 
a crime and that the record supports that defendant committed 
that crime. We hold further that there is sufficient evidence to 
support the trial court's factual determination that defendant 
was not mentally ill. Therefore, we affirm defendant's 
convictions and sentences. 
fl6 Associate Chief Justice Russon, Justice Durham, 
Justice Durrant, and Justice Wilkms concur in Chief Justice 
Howe's opinion. 
7 No. 20000238 
